The Subjectivity of Consciousness

In the eighth chapter of, The Problem With Consciousness, Colin McGinn addresses the notion of consciousness and discusses its relationship towards artefacts and organic entities. Being that the idea of consciousness is quite difficult to delineate and comprehend, he narrows the focus and concentrates primarily on the attribute of subjectivity. He argues that for a machine to obtain consciousness, it is necessary that mankind have a complete understanding for the human brain and the relationship between its activity and subsequent cognizance. For this reason, McGinn is hesitant to suggest that a conscious computer or machine could be constructed. While the technology and understanding for how to construct an extremely powerful computational machine is currently available, he argues that “knowing how to build a computing machine is not knowing how to build a conscious machine.”

McGinn's skepticism can be attributed to the notion that “consciousness is a computational property of the brain.” He feels that the brain's chemical makeup cannot be responsible for consciousness, because a chemical substance cannot exude a sense of subjectivity. Similarly, one of the arguments McGinn makes is that the “physical causes and effects cannot give rise to consciousness.” This statement is a criticism to the functionalist theory of the mind, and argues that the suggested properties are too unspecific to the brain. In other words, the properties that a functionalist claims are responsible for consciousness can be found in various other areas of the body, and therefore, are irrelevant to the subjectivity of the brain.

Another notion McGinn is critical of is computationalism. He feels the position that consciousness is directly related to cerebral computations, “cannot explain the existence of conscious subjectivity.” He argues that if computations can occur without realization, then consciousness cannot be solely defined through computational means. According to McGinn, if the computational approach towards consciousness is accurate, then mankind is currently capable of producing conscious mechanical entities. The reason for this is that present day machines are already built upon a foundation of computational properties; thus, if the human brain is simply a type of data processor, then mental attributes, such as subjectivity, can be likened to the programs and processes of a typical desktop computer. While McGinn concedes that an unknown level of computational complexity could still be the underlying factor in the reasons for human consciousness, he argues it is highly unlikely that cerebral computations form or define consciousness as a whole.

Throughout the chapter McGinn discusses and critiques the modern suggestions for what makes the human brain conscious. It is evident that in order to create a conscious machine, one must first understand such particularities. McGinn's criticisms of functionalism and computationalism are well founded, if not simply for the fact that such considerations have yet to produce a machine capable of subjectivity. In other words, basing a computational device such as a computer or robotic entity on the suggestions of such views would not produce a conscious being. For this reason, it can be argued that, at some level, such positions are erroneous in their descriptions of human consciousness, and therefore, McGinn is justified in his criticism.

It should be noted, however, that McGinn provides no statement in which he is critical of future development into artificial consciousness. In fact, his acceptance for the potentiality of conscious machines lies in a hybrid of functionalism and computationalism. This is evident in his suggestion that “supervenience assures us that the brain has some property which confers consciousness upon it.” The notion of functionalism or computationalism both suggest that something, whether it be a chemical property or calculation, is providing the basis behind the consciousness. Therefore, as the scientific community progresses to the point whereby they can fully replicate the human brain, it can be argued that consciousness would then transpire.

As previously stated, McGinn's examination and critique of functionalism and computationalism, as they relate to human consciousness, pertain only to the current availability of technical and cognitive information. What is important to notice, however, is that if mankind fails to completely grasp the reasons behind consciousness, then replicating it, even to the most minuscule of an extent, will remain an impossibility. Understanding the computational or functional aspects of consciousness is important, however as McGinn would argue, such components cannot be the sole factors in a subjective being. Thus, understanding the properties that are responsible for human consciousness is the most important question in the pursuit of a mechanized subjectivity.

The whole of McGinn's argument focuses on the capabilities and suggestions of modern day computer engineers and cognitive scientists, and explains how the machines and computers of today have no potential for attaining subjectivity. Likewise, the basis of his skepticism lies in mankind's current understanding, or lack thereof, concerning the property or properties responsible for creating consciousness. However, the underlying suggestion McGinn may be conveying is that mankind should focus on understanding itself before it attempts to replicate its consciousness in the form of artificial entities. While McGinn's argument throughout the chapter is skeptical of conscious machines, he provides no evidence that such a goal could not be realized in the near or distant future. If the “design feature” that makes the human brain conscious can be unveiled, then the realization of artificial consciousness can commence.